Wednesday, February 17, 2010

one’s [your?] projections may not be
the other’s [my?] unconsciousness

I’m deliberately avoiding allusion to philosophical views that come easily to mind when I do my discursive sketches, because I’m gradually setting up a perspective that would be the basis for traditional philosophical engagements.

For example: I’m aware that my notes about a “...’Self’ interested ethic” could seem to some readers to be implicitly a Kantian valuation of persons as ends unto themselves. But whose end? The end that the Kantian apperceives independently from engagement with the other? The end that the Kantian perceives through engagement? Does a person understand their life in terms of an end? Does a person understand their life as an open-ended venture? A Project? What’s a very good way to understand the ongoingness of a well-growing life? I’m not oriented by Kantian views. Down the road, I might engage Kantian views—likely, though, in terms of others’ engagement with Kant, e.g., Michael Slote (whose critique of Kant’s ethics is extensive) or Martha Nussbaum, who steers away from Kant’s alienation from his own embodiment (his problem of “inclinatons”). The issue would be: How to mediate what I’m doing with Kantian conceptions (including “Transcendental Illusions”).

Another example: I know that my endearment to discursivity can be read to suggest Hegel’s interest in a phenomenology which seeks completion in the conception of its completing, the “Absolute Concept,” i.e., the comprehensive conception of the phenomenology that completes itself via engagement with its own conceiving. My interest in discursive integrating which advances our self-understanding of inquiry as such is no interest in any discursive Completion. I would even humbly suggest that I’m working beyond Heidegger, but presently in proximal terms.